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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we examine the effects of CEO bonus intensity and monitoring of companies on 
companies mandatory disclosure on acquisitions. We conduct our study in a low enforcement 
environment by using unique data on Swedish listed companies in the years 2011-2013. In the 
analysis, we use a self-constructed disclosure index and ordered logistic regressions. 
We find that only 23 percent of all companies that made acquisitions disclosed all mandatory 
information. We also find that there is a positive relationship between the amount of 
monitoring a company is subject to and their disclosure on acquisitions and a negative 
relationship between CEO bonus intensity and the disclosure on acquisitions. 
We contribute to the literature by examining goodwill accounting in a low enforcement 
environment and by examining effects on mandatory disclosure instead of voluntary 
disclosure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
We investigate how monitoring and CEO bonus intensity affect disclosure on goodwill 
accounting in a low enforcement environment. 
The field of goodwill accounting has historically focused on factors influencing purchase price 
allocations and the effects of excess allocation to goodwill, and the research on financial 
disclosures has predominantly focused on voluntary disclosures in annual reports. In this 
paper, we combine these two lines of research and expand the horizon of both fields by 
investigating disclosure on goodwill accounting. 
The disclosure literature investigates causes for voluntary disclosures and the effects 
increased voluntary disclosure can have. The likely reason for such a one-sided focus on 
voluntary disclosure instead of also investigating mandatory disclosure comes from the 
assumption that mandatory information is always disclosed. Mandatory disclosures are 
disclosures demanded by accounting standards, so one would expect companies to disclose 
this information. Companies choose to follow the law because there are sanctions if they do 
not comply. As such, compliance with the law demands a high enforcement environment. 
In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) provide a high degree of 
enforcement with their monitoring of firms and efforts to combat financial fraud and enhance 
issuer disclosures. It has therefore been most focus on the study of voluntary disclosure. In 
countries with low enforcement, the study of mandatory disclosure will also be interesting 
since it is not certain that companies actually comply with the accounting standards. 
In an environment with low enforcement from the government, it will become even more 
important with a high degree of monitoring from private investors. A company whose annual 
report is not subject to a high degree of monitoring will have a better opportunity to disclose 
less information. Hope’s (2002) findings, that there is a positive relation between the number 
of financial analysts following a company and the amount of disclosure, support this 
hypothesis. 
In accordance with agency theory, many firms make parts of the CEO remuneration variable 
to align CEO interests with shareholder interests. When this variable part is tied to a profit 
measure, it can cause managers to allocate in excess to goodwill to increase short-term 
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earnings (Shalev, 2009). Unlike other intangible assets, goodwill is not subject to amortization, 
but is tested yearly for impairment. 
When management has allocated in excess to goodwill, they have greater incentives to try to 
hide it by not disclosing all the required information on the acquisition. Since bonus intensity 
affects manager’s propensity for opportunism, we hypothesize that it should also lead to less 
disclosure on acquisitions. 
We conduct our tests by using unique data on Swedish listed firms in the period 2011-2013. 
We focus on Sweden because this is a country with low enforcement of disclosure 
requirements on acquisitions. It is also an interesting research setting due to its many large 
international firms and high frequency of acquisitions. Bonuses in Sweden is mostly cash 
bonuses, which simplifies our analysis. 
The study has a greater importance when set in a low enforcement environment such as 
Sweden, than in a high enforcement environment such as the US. Firstly, because there is a 
high degree of non-compliance with IFRS 3. Secondly, when there is less enforcement from 
the government, it is necessary with more market supervision, hence there should be stronger 
effects of monitoring on disclosure in a low enforcement environment. The same goes for the 
effect of bonus intensity on disclosure. 
We test the effect of monitoring and CEO’s bonus intensity on firm’s disclosure on goodwill 
accounting in a low enforcement environment, and find that there is a positive relationship 
between monitoring and disclosure, and a negative relationship between CEO bonus intensity 
and disclosure. 
Our contribution is that we examine goodwill accounting in a low enforcement environment 
and further contribute by examining the effects on mandatory disclosure instead of voluntary 
disclosure. That is, we examine the effects of market monitoring and bonus intensity on 
compliance with IFRS 3.  
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. In Section 2, we review prior literature 
and Sweden as our research setting. Section 3 expands on our hypotheses and methodology. 
Section 4 reports the results of our analyses and Section 5 discuss these results. Finally, we 
provide concluding remarks in Section 6. 
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2. PRIOR LITERATURE AND THE RESEARCH SETTING 
2.1 Disclosure 
The study of accounting disclosure is of importance to investors, researchers, companies, 
market participants, standard setters and regulatory bodies. Although disclosure is an 
important research topic, it is a theoretical concept which is difficult to measure directly. 
Consequently, researchers have not agreed on the best way of measuring disclosure. We 
generally classify measures into two main groups: proxies for disclosure that are not based on 
the researcher examining the original disclosure vehicle, and proxies for disclosure that 
depend on examining the original disclosure vehicle (Hassan & Marston, 2010).  
Although there are many different types of financial disclosure, most researchers consider the 
annual report among the most important disclosures by companies (Marston & Shrives, 1991). 
Therefore, the focus of most studies on disclosure has been on voluntary information in the 
annual report. One of the methods commonly used to measure the disclosure in annual 
reports is a disclosure index. Disclosure indices are extensive lists of selected items, which may 
be disclosed in a company report (Marston & Shrives, 1991).  
In her study from 1998, Sengupta examines the association between the high disclosure 
ratings from financial analysts and costs of debt. She finds that firms with high disclosure 
ratings enjoy a lower cost of debt. 
Among the costs of disclosure are the costs of information production and dissemination. 
Furthermore, competitors may make use of available information about a company to their 
own advantages (Verrecchia, 1983). If a company disclose erroneous information, they can be 
subject to lawsuits further increasing the costs of disclosure (Skinner, 1994). Therefore, Healy 
and Palepu (1993) advice that a decision to provide more information to the public should, in 
theory, be based on a cost-benefit analysis, although detailed estimation of all costs and 
benefits is difficult. 
 
2.2 Monitoring 
There has been several studies looking at the relationship between monitoring and disclosure, 
most notably between the number of analysts following a company and the general disclosure 
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level. Financial analysts serve an important role as intermediaries between firms and investors 
(Hope, 2002). Lang and Lundholm (1996) finds that a firm with more informative disclosures 
have more analysts following the firm.  
Hope (2002) finds a positive relationship between the number of analysts following a company 
and the disclosure the company provides in their annual report, supporting the findings of 
Lang and Lundholm. More specifically, he finds that analyst following is more strongly 
associated with the extent of note disclosure than the comprehensiveness of the basic 
financial statements. 
 
2.3 Purchase price allocation and bonus intensity 
In their study from 2011, Hamberg, Paananen and Novak find that goodwill recognized in 
acquisitions increased substantially in Sweden after the implementation of IFRS 3. It is unlikely 
that such a shift is caused by economic parameters alone. More likely the explanation is that 
it has become more beneficial for CEOs to allocate more to goodwill after the adoption of IFRS 
3. This is supported by Dechow and Huson (1994), and Adut, Cready, and Lopez (2003), who 
find that CEO bonuses are shielded from nonrecurring losses, such as an impairment due to 
over-allocation of goodwill. This will increase management’s incentives for excess allocation 
of goodwill. This is especially the case when the CEO has an earnings-based bonus plan (Shalev, 
Zhang, & Zhang, 2013). 
Moreover, Hirshey and Richardson (2003) find that investors underreact to news about 
goodwill write-offs with regard to the stock price. Thus, although a CEO has shares in a 
company he still has incentives to over-allocate to goodwill in order to achieve a higher bonus, 
because the resulting fall in stock price will be less than the fall in real value when the goodwill 
write-offs take place. 
 
There has been several studies discussing CEO compensation packages and purchase price 
allocation. Shalev, Zhang and Zhang (2013) conduct an investigation into the effect of bonus 
intensity and CEO age on goodwill allocation. They find evidence that CEOs whose 
compensation packages rely more on earnings-based bonus tend to allocate more to goodwill 
when acquiring companies. Their results are also valid for European firms, as demonstrated 
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by Detzen and Zülch (2012), who find that there is a positive relationship between bonus 
intensity and goodwill allocation.  
Furthermore, Shalev (2009) finds that the disclosure level on acquisitions decreases with 
excess allocation to goodwill. This suggests that a high bonus intensity will lead to incentives 
for managerial opportunism by allocating more of the purchase price to goodwill, which in 
turn leads to less disclosure on acquisitions. 
 
2.4 Sweden as research setting 
To protect stakeholders, the EU has ascertained that an organization is required to conduct 
enforcement of financial information to make sure that annual reports are correct and that 
companies comply with the accounting standards. In Sweden, this task was given to 
Finansinspektionen (FI), the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, alongside the two 
Swedish stock exchanges, NASDAQ OMX Stockholm AB and Nordic Growth Market NGM AB 
(Finansinspektionen, 2014). The role of FI is to coordinate enforcement in Sweden and Europe, 
and to ensure that enforcement in Sweden is of high, consistent quality. The stock exchanges, 
on the other hand, are responsible for enforcement of financial information of the companies 
on their respective regulated markets (Finansinspektionen, 2014). 
Sweden is unique in the European Economic Area (EEA) with respect to the stock exchange 
having the responsibility to supervise that the information in the annual report is consistent 
with the law (Heneryd & Hjelström, 2009), and that this authority is delegated through 
Swedish law (Finansinspektionen, 2014).  
 
FI selects a sample of companies to control based on a combination of a rotation approach 
and a risk-based approach. Their goal is to ensure that they review each company on the 
regulated markets at least once during a five-year period. 
Out of the 252 companies on Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE), 37 percent were checked for 
flaws in the annual report in 2013, and 21 percent of these were given remarks for lacking 
required information (Finansinspektionen, 2014). Less than 40 percent of controls that SSE 
performed were for the entire annual report.  
11 
 
 
 
The SEC is FI’s American counterpart. They have a high focus on enforcement and prosecute 
companies that do not comply with the law. In addition to giving substantial fines when not 
complying with the disclosure laws, it is common for the SEC to sue violating employees as 
individuals. Both the name of the company and the name of the violators are publicly 
disclosed. 
According to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances, Shleifer and Vishny (1999), “Sweden has some of the 
highest law enforcements, accounting standards and anti-corruption indices in the world”. 
Sweden also has a well-developed code of corporate governance (Swedish Corporate 
Governance Board, 2010), where in contrast to the US code of corporate governance, the 
Chairman of the board of directors and the CEO cannot be the same person (Grapsas & Powell, 
2013). The SCGC follows the “comply or explain” principle. Although Sweden in general has 
some of the highest law enforcements, the enforcement of disclosure on acquisitions is low.  
 
The drawbacks of using the Swedish setting instead of e.g. the US, is that most previous 
literature is not directly comparable. Research set in the US is in a high enforcement 
environment and therefore focus on voluntary disclosure. Although the findings are on 
voluntary disclosure, it is probable that the inferences will be the same for mandatory 
disclosure as well. E.g. if cost of debt decreases with more voluntary disclosure as Sengupta 
(1998) finds, we expect that the cost of debt will also decrease as a company increases its 
disclosure from none to the mandatory information required.  
 
The overall problem we investigate is the effect bonus intensity and monitoring have on 
disclosure on acquisition. Sweden is an ideal setting to investigate this problem, since the low 
enforcement is likely to increase the effects of monitoring and bonus intensity on the 
disclosure. It is also a country with many large and international firms and a high level of 
acquisitions. Our findings from Sweden should therefore be generalizable to other low 
enforcement countries. 
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3. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Hypotheses 
Sengupta (1998) shows that increased disclosure leads to lower costs of debt. When 
companies still choose not to disclose all mandatory information, they must have motives that 
surpasses the benefits of disclosure and cause them to break the law. Such motives may be 
costs, hiding information from competitors or future targets, or it may be to hide managerial 
opportunism. However, it is not enough to have incentives not to disclose everything required, 
the company also needs opportunity to do so. If a company’s annual report is subject to a lot 
of monitoring, it would reduce the opportunity to hide information. Hope’s (2002) findings, 
that there is a positive relation between the number of financial analysts following the firm 
and overall disclosure level, support this claim.  
 
H1: More disclosure on acquisitions is positively related to monitoring. 
 
Detzen and Zülch (2012), and Shalev, Zhang and Zhang (2013) find that a high bonus intensity 
for CEOs leads to excess allocation of goodwill in acquisitions. Their explanation is that as the 
variable part of the CEO’s remuneration increases, so does his incentives for managerial 
opportunism, and one way to increase earnings is to allocate more of the purchase price to 
goodwill. Building on the assumption that increased bonus intensity will increase managerial 
opportunism, we hypothesize that the incentives for disclosing complete information 
regarding acquisitions will decrease as the incentives for managerial opportunism increases. 
The assumption is supported by Shalev’s (2009) finding that abnormal allocation of goodwill 
leads to less disclosure. We expect that a high bonus intensity will lead to less disclosure on 
acquisitions. 
 
H2: More disclosure on acquisitions is negatively related to bonus intensity. 
 
3.2 Model 
Our hypotheses is that monitoring and bonus intensity affect the disclosure level on 
acquisitions. To avoid potential problems with endogeneity we include both variables of 
interest along with the control variables in one model. 
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𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐶𝑇 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽4𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑊
+ 𝛽8𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅+∈ 
In this model, we also control for differences between industries by setting industry as the 
panel-defining variable. 
 
3.3 Disclosures 
In accordance with previous research (Hope, 2003; Sengupta, 1998; Chow & Wong-Boren, 
1987), we use a disclosure index to measure the amount of disclosure of acquisitions. We have 
had full involvement in designing the disclosure index in order to make it measure not only 
the extent of information given, but also to measure the quality of the information disclosed. 
The drawback of not using an existing index is that we cannot make direct comparisons with 
previous research (Marston & Shrives, 1991). Another potential limitation of using a self-
constructed disclosure index is that the results are only valid to the extent that we use an 
appropriate index (Hassan & Marston, 2010). 
In our disclosure index, we grade each acquisition from 0 to 7 based on 7 different mandatory 
information items, as shown in table 1. We focus only on the mandatory disclosure items, 
therefore a score of 7 indicates that the firm has disclosed all accounting items required for 
the acquisition. If a company discloses several acquisitions separately, the overall disclosure 
score for that year will be the median of the scores for the individual acquisitions. 
 
Information item Not disclosed Disclosed 
Name of target firm 0 1 
Country of target firm 0 1 
Number of targets per disclosure 0 1 
Only one target per disclosure 0 1 
Total concideration offered 0 1 
Original book values of target 0 1 
Adjustments of book values to fair value 0 1 
 
Table 1, Variables in the disclosure index 
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To evaluate which statistical tests to use, it is necessary to evaluate what level of 
measurement we achieve by using the disclosure index. The data is at least ordinal and the 
question then becomes whether or not it is interval data. One way to transform the disclosure 
index into interval data is to assign weights to the different variables. To achieve such weights 
it is common to conduct attitude surveys among relevant user groups (Marston & Shrives, 
1991). In such surveys, it is clear that a 6 is better than a 2, but not necessarily three times as 
important. Weights do not appear to achieve the measurement level of interval data and we 
therefore treat the disclosure index as an ordinal variable. 
 
3.4 Monitoring (+) 
We measure the level of monitoring by using the level of activity in the company’s stock as a 
proxy. A company with a high level of activity will be subject to more scrutiny, because this 
means that more investors have owned the shares, and has therefore likely analyzed the firm 
to some extent. We measure activity as each firm’s share of the total trading volume 
compared to the average trading volume per stock. 
 
3.5 Bonus intensity (-) 
Shalev, Zhang and Zhang (2013) find that the bonus intensity of managers influence how much 
they allocate to goodwill. Shalev (2009) finds that such an excess allocation to goodwill leads 
to less disclosure by the company. By combining the findings in these studies, we expect that 
CEOs with high bonus intensity will have incentives to disclose less information regarding 
acquisitions. We measure bonus intensity as the variable part divided by the fixed part of the 
CEO’s remuneration and divide this by the firm’s total assets. 
 
3.6 Control variables 
We select the control variables partly based on prior research and give the expected relation 
with disclosure level in parenthesis. 
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3.6.1 Firm size (+) 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) find that there is a positive correlation between firm size and the 
amount of disclosure by a company. This includes both voluntary and mandatory disclosure. 
We measure size as the logarithm of book value of debt and market value of equity. We use 
market value of equity instead of book value to take into account that some companies have 
large intangible assets that has not been capitalized. In our analysis, we will test if this choice 
has any impact on our results. 
 
3.6.2 Ownership concentration (+) 
Agency theory predicts that a larger shareholder takes more interest in the company and will 
seek to mitigate information asymmetry (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This suggests a positive 
relationship with disclosure levels. To control for ownership concentration we use a dummy 
variable that takes on the value 1 if there are block holders in the company, 0 otherwise. 
 
3.6.3 Leverage (+) 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) observed that agency costs, i.e. costs arising from the information 
asymmetry are higher for firms with a relatively high leverage. Furthermore, high levels of 
disclosure lead to lower costs of debt (Sengupta, 1998). This suggests a positive relationship 
between leverage and disclosure levels. 
 
3.6.4 Profitability (-) 
Investors give companies with high profitability more slack when it comes to disclosure than 
they give companies with low profitability. We measure profitability as return on equity (ROE).  
 
3.6.5 Goodwill (+) 
For a company with a high degree of capitalized goodwill, the goodwill will be a more 
substantial part of the firm’s assets and therefore information about further acquisitions may 
be more important to shareholders than it would be in a firm with no previous capitalized 
goodwill.  
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3.6.6 Year 
We include dummy variables for the years 2012 and 2013 to control for effects arising from 
changes in accounting policy between years. 
 
3.6.7 Industry 
We use one-number SIC codes as the industry variable. We use industry as the panel defining 
variable to control for potential differences between industries. 
 
3.7 Data collection 
We have hand-collected data on acquisitions from all companies listed on the Swedish Stock 
Exchange, NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, in the years 2011-2013, by going through each annual 
report. Other data1 come from Bureau van Dijk, Compustat and annual reports. 
Our original sample consisted of 749 observations. Removing all companies that had not made 
any acquisitions reduced the sample to 243. We further remove financial companies and 
companies with missing values for CEO remuneration reducing the sample to 229 and 210. To 
avoid problems arising from extreme values on size, we remove companies with total assets 
less than SEK 200 million and total assets more than SEK 200.000 million, reducing the sample 
size to 195. If we do not remove these extreme values, size will be the only significant variable. 
Finally, data limitations for market value of equity and block holders reduce the sample to 194 
and 185. Our final sample consists of 185 observations from 97 different companies listed on 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 We thank Mattias Hamberg for providing us with the data. 
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4. RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Since disclosure is an ordinal variable, we report median and quartiles. The median score of 
disclosure is 6, which is the score for 46 percent of our observations. Only 23 percent of the 
observations have the maximum score of seven. 25 percent have a disclosure of 5 or lower. 
Although the disclosure index ranges from 0 to 7, the range of our observations is from 3 to 7.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLE N 1.quartile median 3.quartile min max 
       
DISC 185 5.00 6.00 6.5 3.00 7.00 
       
 
Table 2, Descriptive statistics for the variable Disclosure index 
 
The descriptive statistics for the independent variables are shown in table 3. The mean activity 
is 0.50, with values ranging from 0.04 to 4.27, which shows that the distribution is skewed. 
The mean bonus intensity relative to firm size is 6.33E-5, with values ranging from 0 to 7.28E-
3. Size is logtransformed, so a mean value of 8.85 is the same as SEK 6 905 million. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
ACT 185 0.50 0.54 0.04 4.27 
BONUS 185 6.33e-05 1.18e-04 0.00 7.28e-04 
SIZE 185 8.84 1.73 5.74 12.49 
BLOCK 185 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
LEV 185 0.58 0.12 0.19 1.07 
ROE 185 0.13 0.20 -1.26 1.37 
BM 185 0.64 0.61 -0.96 4.32 
GW 185 0.27 0.19 0.00 1.75 
      
 
Table 3, Descriptive statistics for all independent variables 
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4.2 Correlations 
Table 4 presents the correlation coefficients. For correlations between the interval variables 
we have used Pearson correlation, but for correlation with disclosure and block holders we 
use Spearman’s rank correlation. The correlations marked with a star are significant on the 5% 
level. 
 
Table 4, Pearson’s correlation of all variables except for correlations for Disclosure and 
Blockholders which are Spearman’s correlation 
 
The correlation between disclosure and activity in the company stock is -0.01, and the 
correlation between disclosure and bonus intensity is -0.03. Neither of these correlations are 
significant. These findings are contradictory to our hypotheses that there is a clear relationship 
between the disclosure on acquisitions and the variables of interest.  
There are significant correlations between size and activity, 0.42, and between size and bonus 
intensity, -0.38. Neither of these correlations are large enough to cause a problem for further 
analysis. The correlations between size and all other control variables, except goodwill, are 
significant. 
 
4.3 Ordered logistic regression 
The dependent variable, disclosure on acquisitions, is an ordinal variable, which limits our 
range of possible tests. The most suitable test for our model is the ordered logistic regression, 
which is a regression model for an ordinal dependent variable and several independent 
  DISC  ACT  BONUS  SIZE  BLOCK  LEV  ROE  GW 
DISC 1,00               
ACT -0,01  1,00             
BONUS -0,03  -0,07  1,00           
SIZE -0,13  0,42 * -0,38 * 1,00         
BLOCK 0,15 * -0,26 * -0,09  -0,26 * 1,00       
LEV 0,10  0,14  -0,27 * 0,21 * 0,13  1,00     
ROE -0,02  0,05  -0,05  0,23 * -0,15 * 0,18 * 1,00   
GW 0,04  0,04  0,05  -0,04  0,09  0,21 * -0,06  1,0 
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variables. The implications of using this model instead of an OLS regression is that the 
coefficients cannot be interpreted directly from the model, but requires further analysis. 
There are four underlying assumptions that must be fulfilled to use the ordered logistic 
regression. The first and second assumption is that the dependent variable is ordinal and that 
the independent variables are continuous, ordinal or categorical. All our variables fulfill these 
assumptions. 
The third assumption assumes that there is no problems with multicollinearity. We calculate 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) to test for multicollinearity. The VIF ranges from 1 to infinity. 
A rule of thumb says that a variable has a large degree of multicollinearity if the VIF value is 
larger than 10. This assumption is fulfilled as all VIF values are less than 2. 
The last assumption is that we have proportional odds, i.e. that each independent variable 
have an identical effect at each split of the ordinal variable. To test this assumption we use 
omodel, a likelihood-ratio test. Our null hypothesis in this test is that there is no difference in 
the coefficients between models. If the test yields a significant result the assumption of 
proportional odds is violated. 
The approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories 
gave a chi-squared value of 37.74 with a probability of 0.658. The assumption of proportional 
odds is therefore fulfilled and we can use the ordinal logistic regression. 
The ordered logistic regression gives the coefficients and significance level for each of the 
independent variables. In addition, we generate the odds ratio for each variable. If the odds 
ratio is above 1, then for a one unit increase in the independent variable the odds of a high 
disclosure increases, and vice versa. 
We test our model using the ordered logistic regression, controlling for differences between 
industries by treating industry classification as our panel-defining variable, and differences 
between years by using dummy variables for 2012 and 2013. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Logit coeff Odds ratio VIF 
    
ACT 0.72** 2.05** 1.23 
 (0.33) (0.69) (0.17) 
BONUS -3.30** 0.00** 0.00** 
 (1,40) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE -0.33*** 0.72*** 0.88*** 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.04) 
BLOCK 0.40 1.49 1.13 
 (0.31) (0.46) (0.16) 
LEV 0.91 2.49 1.59 
 (1.31) (3.25) (0.94) 
ROE -0.70 0.50 0.82 
 (0.79) (0.39) (0.28) 
GW 0.45 1.57 1.27 
 (0.74) (1.16) (0.46) 
2012.YEAR -0.58* 0.56* 0.80 
 (0.35) (0.19) (0.13) 
2013.YEAR -0.39 0.68 0.80 
 (0.37) (0.25) (0.14) 
    
Observations 185 185 185 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5, Results from Ordered Logistic Regression with Disclosure as dependent variable 
 
From our ordered logistic regression, we find that both activity in the company stock and 
bonus intensity is significant on the 5% level. The odds ratio of activity is 2.05, which suggests 
a strong positive relationship with the disclosure on acquisitions. The odds ratio of bonus 
intensity is 0.00. This low number is due to the bonus intensity being divided by the firm’s total 
assets. However, it still gives us that the relationship between bonus intensity and disclosure 
is negative. The VIF values for all variables are very low, suggesting that multicollinearity is not 
a problem in our model. 
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The only control variables that are significant are size and the dummy for 2012. The correlation 
between size and disclosure is negative, contradicting our assumption of a positive 
relationship. None of the other control variables is significant. 
We also test if the results differ when we use book value of equity instead of market value in 
our calculation of size. There are minor changes in the coefficients, but this does not affect 
our inferences. 
Running the ordered logistic regression with only activity, bonus intensity and size as 
explanatory variables yields the same results, but with greater significance. This regression is 
included in the appendix. 
The coefficients from the ordered logistic regression can be used to calculate the probability 
of a specific disclosure level given a value for each independent variable. We vary the level of 
activity while holding all other variables constant at their mean value. We get a probability for 
each level of disclosure, but group these into low (0-5), medium (5.5-6) and high (6.5-7). This 
yields the following graph of probabilities for disclosure with varying amounts of activity. 
 
 
Figure 1, Probability of low, medium and high disclosure with varying amounts of activity and 
all other variables at mean value 
0,0 %
10,0 %
20,0 %
30,0 %
40,0 %
50,0 %
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ACT=0,5 ACT=1 ACT=1,5 ACT=2
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From the graph, we see that the probability of high disclosure will increase from 25 to 50 
percent as activity increases from 0.5 to 2. At the same time, the probability for low disclosure 
decreases from 23 to 10 percent as activity increases from 0.5 to 2. 
From the ordered logistic regression we find that both activity and bonus intensity has an 
effect on disclosure level. However, when we tested for correlation between only disclosure 
level and one of the variables, the results were not significant. We hold the ordered logistic 
regression to be most correct in this analysis due to endogeneity problems arising when 
testing the effects of just one variable on the disclosure level. 
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5. ANALYSIS 
Despite IFRS 3 demanding full disclosure, we find that only 23 percent disclosed all accounting 
items required. Although IFRS 3 states that firms are obligated to disclose information only on 
significant acquisitions, it is not likely that this is the case for 77 percent of the acquiring 
companies. Another explanation could be that supervision by the authorities may be too poor. 
The consequences of a remark from SSE can be a fine and to correct the information. All 
remarks in 2013 lead to the company having to correct the mistake in future financial reports. 
The implication of making the firms give the correction in the consecutive annual report is that 
it delays important information for investors. Various research give evidence that the ability 
to predict future earnings is improved significantly when firms provide high levels of disclosure 
(Lundholm & Myers, 2002; Gelb & Zarowin, 2002; Hussainey, Schleicher, & Walker, 2003). To 
protect investors, SSE ought to force companies with lacking reports to make the correction 
in the current annual report, instead of the consecutive report. 
Our results suggest that the enforcement of disclosure on acquisitions in Sweden is not as 
effective as it ought to be. One of the reasons is likely the delegation of responsibility to the 
SSE. The way enforcement is carried out should therefore be changed into one supervisory 
authority with full responsibility, in line with FI’s own recommendations (Heneryd & 
Hjelström, 2009). 
We find that low monitoring of a company stock is correlated to low disclosure on acquisitions. 
Therefore, instead of randomly choosing firms for control, FI could stratify the sample and 
prioritize firms with low stock activity for a full control. In this sense, FI compensates for the 
lack of monitoring by investors. On the other hand, one might say that firms with a lot of 
activity have more investors that need to be protected, and therefore should be monitored 
even closer. 
The claim from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999), and Holmen and 
Högfeldt (2004), that “Sweden has some of the highest law enforcement, accounting 
standards and anti-corruption indices in the world” is doubtful, at least regarding acquisitions. 
Our findings compared to FI’s findings regarding lacking information in the annual report 
strongly suggests that the enforcement is weaker than the previous claim.  
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Prior research suggests that CEOs with higher bonus intensity allocates more of the purchase 
price in acquisitions to goodwill (Shalev, Zhang, & Zhang, 2013). They do this in order to 
increase their bonuses, as the excess allocation of goodwill helps to increase earnings in the 
short run. Shalev (2009) also finds that excess allocation to goodwill leads to less disclosure. 
These findings are supported by the negative correlation we find between bonus intensity and 
disclosure on acquisitions.  
Agency theory suggests that CEO bonuses are implemented to align CEO interests with those 
of the shareholders. Bonuses might have much of the desired effect, but as our and Shalev’s 
(2009) results suggest, there are negative effects of bonuses as well. With increased bonus 
intensity the disclosure on acquisitions is likely to be lower and it is more likely that there will 
be excess allocation to goodwill, which in turn is bad for investors.  
Since transparency is of great importance to investors, the executive board and the general 
assembly should take the possible negative effects on disclosure into consideration when 
making decisions regarding the structure of the CEO bonus package.  
In our analysis, we find that monitoring is positively related to disclosure. However, the 
causality is not certain, as it might be that increased disclosure leads to increased monitoring. 
Most likely, this relationship is circular, where increased monitoring incentivizes the firm to 
disclose more information, and the increased disclosure makes the company more attractive 
to investors, which in turn might lead to more monitoring. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we examine the impact of CEO bonus intensity and monitoring on mandatory 
disclosure of goodwill accounting in a low enforcement environment. Previous studies have 
found that a higher bonus intensity leads to excess allocation of goodwill (Shalev, Zhang, & 
Zhang, 2013; Detzen & Zülch, 2012). We hypothesize that if a manager has allocated in excess 
to goodwill, he has greater incentives to try to hide it by disclosing less information. Studies 
have also found a positive relation between the number of analysts following a company and 
the company’s amount of disclosure (Hope, 2002). Since not only registered analysts analyze 
a company and monitor their financial report, we proxy for monitoring by using the activity in 
the company’s stock. Research on goodwill accounting has predominantly focused on the US 
and to some extent on Europe in general. This entails that the focus has been on voluntary 
disclosure, as it is assumed that all mandatory information is disclosed. We conduct our 
research on Swedish listed companies, where there is low enforcement of disclosure 
requirements on acquisitions. Thus, our research focus on the mandatory disclosure on 
acquisitions. 
Our results from analyzing data on Swedish listed firms in the years 2011-2013 show that only 
23 percent of all firms that had made acquisitions disclosed all mandatory information items. 
We find that companies that are subject to a lot of monitoring have high disclosure on 
acquisitions and companies where the CEO has high bonus intensity have low disclosure on 
acquisitions.  
These findings suggest that the methods employed by SSE and FI for discovering lacking 
information is inadequate. This is supported by FI themselves who argue for a change in how 
enforcement should be carried out (Heneryd & Hjelström, 2009). 
We contribute to the literature in several ways. We examine goodwill accounting in a low 
enforcement environment by using data on Swedish listed companies. We further contribute 
by examining the effects of monitoring and bonus intensity on compliance with international 
accounting standards. Previous studies have found that high bonus intensity leads to a higher 
allocation to goodwill (Shalev, Zhang, & Zhang, 2013) and that excess allocation of goodwill 
leads to lower disclosure on acquisitions (Shalev, 2009). We bridge these two studies with our 
finding that high bonus intensity leads to lower disclosure on acquisitions. 
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A caveat of our research is that we treat firms that do not mention any acquisitions as not 
having acquired any companies, but it could also be the case that they have acquired a 
business without disclosing it. An implication of using a self-constructed disclosure index is the 
possibility of low measurement validity. In addition, when doing manual data collection there 
is always a possibility of human error.  
In our sample, every annual report has been audited, but we still find many reports with 
missing information. A line of further research could be to examine if there are differences 
between auditors and the amount of discrepancy they allow for.  
In our study, we do not examine each company’s rationale for not disclosing all mandatory 
information. This could be done in future research by conducting in-depth research on the 
individual companies that do not disclose all mandatory information. It could also be 
interesting to study whether a sanction from FI leads to better disclosure in the future or if 
the sanction has little effect. 
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8. APPENDIX 
8.1 Ordered logistic regression results complete model 
This table shows the results from the ordered logistic regression (OLR) of disclosure on 
acquisitions. The dependent variable is disclosure, and the independent variables are activity, 
bonus intensity, size, blockholders, leverage, ROE, goodwill and year. Industry has been used 
as a panel-defining variable. Odds ratio and variance inflation factor (measure of colinearity) 
is also included. All assumptions of OLR are fulfilled. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Logit coeff Odds ratio VIF 
    
ACT 0.718** 2.049** 1.225 
 (0.334) (0.685) (0.170) 
BONUS -3,302** 0** 0** 
 (1,399) (0) (0) 
SIZE -0.334*** 0.716*** 0.883*** 
 (0.108) (0.0775) (0.0411) 
BLOCK 0.400 1.492 1.129 
 (0.307) (0.458) (0.160) 
LEV 0.914 2.494 1.591 
 (1.305) (3.254) (0.940) 
ROE -0.695 0.499 0.821 
 (0.790) (0.394) (0.283) 
GW 0.450 1.568 1.271 
 (0.740) (1.161) (0.455) 
2012.YEAR -0.581* 0.559* 0.795 
 (0.345) (0.193) (0.128) 
2013.YEAR -0.387 0.679 0.802 
 (0.371) (0.252) (0.138) 
    
Constant cut1 -7.147*** 0.000787***  
 (1.403) (0.00110)  
Constant cut2 -6.733*** 0.00119***  
 (1.342) (0.00160)  
Constant cut3 -5.111*** 0.00603***  
 (1.236) (0.00745)  
Constant cut4 -3.641*** 0.0262***  
 (1.205) (0.0316)  
Constant cut5 -3.523*** 0.0295***  
 (1.203) (0.0355)  
Constant cut6 -1.339 0.262  
 (1.175) (0.308)  
Constant cut7 -1.144 0.319  
 (1.175) (0.374)  
    
Observations 185 185 185 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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8.2 Ordered logistic regression results simplified model 
This table shows the results from the ordered logistic regression (OLR) of disclosure on 
acquisitions. The dependent variable is disclosure, and the independent variables are activity, 
bonus intensity and size. Odds ratio and variance inflation factor (measure of colinearity) is 
also included. All assumptions of OLR are fulfilled. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Logit coeff Odds ratio VIF 
    
ACT 0.766** 2.151** 1.294* 
 (0.317) (0.683) (0.169) 
BONUS -3,315** 0** 0** 
 (1,319) (0) (0) 
SIZE -0.370*** 0.691*** 0.870*** 
 (0.103) (0.0708) (0.0383) 
    
Constant cut1 -7.769*** 0.000423***  
 (1.178) (0.000498)  
Constant cut2 -7.355*** 0.000639***  
 (1.104) (0.000706)  
Constant cut3 -5.734*** 0.00323***  
 (0.972) (0.00314)  
Constant cut4 -4.266*** 0.0140***  
 (0.929) (0.0131)  
Constant cut5 -4.148*** 0.0158***  
 (0.926) (0.0146)  
Constant cut6 -2.027** 0.132**  
 (0.881) (0.116)  
Constant cut7 -1.841** 0.159**  
 (0.879) (0.139)  
    
Observations 185 185 185 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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8.3 List of the data items that were hand-collected from the acquirers’ annual reports 
Information on acquirer: 
 Whether the acquirer explicitly state that they comply with IFRS 3 
 Name and number of auditors 
General information on targets: 
 Number of targets per disclosure 
 Target name 
 Target country 
 Public or private target 
 Amount of ownership purchased 
 Acquisition related costs 
 Stock consideration paid 
 Total consideration paid 
Allocation of purchase price: 
 Goodwill before acquisition 
 Goodwill after acquisition 
 Cash 
 Intangible assets 
 Adjustments to intangible assets 
 Total assets 
 Adjustments to total assets 
 Net assets 
 Adjustments to net assets 
 Tax liabilities 
 Adjustments to tax liabilities 
 Liabilities 
 Adjustments to liabilities 
 Interest bearing debt 
 Adjustments to interest bearing debt 
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8.4 Disclosure requirements under IFRS 3 
Details of the business combination 
 Name and description of the target 
 Acquisition date 
 Percentage of voting equity interests acquired 
 Primary reason for the acquisition 
 
Details of goodwill 
 Qualitative description of the factors that make up the goodwill recognised, such as 
synergies. 
 Total amount of goodwill that is expected to be deductible for tax purpose 
 
Fair value of consideration transferred 
 Acquisition-date fair value of the total and each major class consideration, such as 
goodwill, cash, tangible and intangible assets, liabilities and equity interests of the 
acquirerer. 
 
Details of assets acquired and liabilities assumed 
 Amounts recognised at the acquisition date for each major class of assets acquired and 
liabilities assumed 
 Additional disclosures for each major class of acquired receivables 
 
Aquisition-related costs 
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8.5 Initial recognition of purchase price allocation and accounting treatment 
 
 
Table adopted from Shalev, Zhang and Zhang (2013, p. 838). 
 
 
